In comparative perspective, one immediately notices that American government is both presidential and federal, 1 complicating relationships both horizontally and vertically; and also that, at present, our national legislature, if not our judicial system, is dysfunctional. One hopes that this latter state of affairs will prove transitory, despite the increasing partisanship of American politics. Where partisanship has produced divided government -the presidency in the hands of one party, Congress controlled by the other -unwillingness to compromise has generated repeated budgetary crises, long senatorial delays in confirming presidential nominations to important administrative positions (and even outright rejections), and significant reductions in actual legislating. Presidents, in turn, have been driven to increasingly rely on selfhelp -the use of officials who do not require Senate confirmation to oversee important policy developments, enhanced control over administrative activity, and reliance on regulations and soft-law instruments to do the work that might ordinarily be expected of legislation. In individual states, increasingly identified as "red" or "blue," divided government is less common. A stable one-party dominant state can drift away from the political middle ground; yet as a colleague has recently suggested (Bulman-Pozen 2016) , interactions between the President and the governors of one-party states in conducting shared governmental business have contributed to a form of executive federalism that may seem familiar to comparativists.
It might be added that, from a comparative perspective, politics has an unusually strong hold on the American judiciary as well. The United States does not have a professional judiciary,
given special education and promoted over the course of a single career through increasingly demanding judicial assignments. American judges, educated as all American lawyers are, ascend to the bench mid-career, from private or public practice or from the academy. With few exceptions, 2 the positions to which they ascend are generalist positions in a single judicial hierarchy that encompasses both public and private disputes, both ordinary and constitutional litigation. In a majority of states, judges are elected, making both their selection and their continuance in office not only a matter of political will, but also the result of electoral campaigns to which, under current American law, substantial sums may be contributed by persons believing the outcome may affect their interests. Federal judges are appointed to life terms--nominated by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate. The process has become intensely partisan, as has been illustrated by the controversy over filing the Supreme Court vacancy created by
Justice Antonin Scalia's death. 3 The Court's authority over such socially divisive issues as abortion, gender identity, gun control and the political rights of corporations underscores the stakes. Presidents seek appointments that will project their political preferences well past their terms in office; and Senators from the other party, aware of this, use the confirmation process to slow or even block appointments. Even positions on the intermediate United States Circuit
Courts are contested, with the responsible Senate Committee withholding approval of politically controversial nominations, and other members of the Senate working to obstruct the confirmation of nominees made by Presidents of the other party.
Presidential, not Parliamentary
2 A few jurisdictions treat criminal trials or appeals separately; monetary claims that would operate on the state or national treasury may involve specialist courts; and the initial stage of bankruptcy proceedings, as well, occurs before 'bankruptcy judges' who hear only that kind of case.
3 Justice Scalia, a conservative stalwart on the Supreme Court for 30 years, died 13 February 2016, as presidential election campaigns were heating up. With four months remaining in the current Term of the Court, and certainty that a new President could not place a nominee on the Court until at least half the following year's cases had been heard, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland for the position. Garland was unusually old (63) in relation to recent appointments, and his long tenure as a judge on the country's second most important court for decisions affecting governmental interests, the D.C. Circuit, had established him as an apolitical, centrist candidate. Nonetheless, reflecting the political importance of the position, the Republican-controlled Senate made clear that no hearings would be held on the nomination, or votes permitted, before the November election.
Differences between parliamentary and presidential systems have important implications for administrative governance in relation to the legislature. Formation of a multi-party coalition government in a parliamentary system may be complex and delayed well past the election date; yet the government once formed will immediately be led by a full complement of politically responsible officials with, typically, a rather thin political layer of officials overseeing the work of civil servants. The government rises and falls as a whole when elections are held or confidence is lost. If its ministers are able to reach agreement on a draft of legislation, their relation with the parliament virtually assures its enactment. The drafting is collegial -the prime minister does not put before the parliament proposals bearing his imprint only. And the collective imprint, together with the identification of the ministers with the parliamentary majority, substantially eases the enactment process. Often, if not invariably, ministers are members of the Parliament and participate fully in its proceedings. If that legislation creates ministerial bodies with the authority to issue secondary legislation-that is, regulations -the Council of Ministers or Cabinet is likely to assure that those regulations, also, will be a collective product. Perhaps it will be necessary to lay them before the parliament against the (slim) chance they will be disapproved; in any event, the minister will be directly answerable to that body. And the prime minister, herself, is dependent on collective support for her continued authority; should she lose it, someone else will ascend to her position.
If independent bodies are placed outside this politically unified system in parliamentary systems, one consequence could be that any authority they have to adopt secondary legislation (regulations) requires the use of public procedures (like the American notice-and-comment procedures), which are not required of ministerial agencies adopting such measures. The important point for present purposes is to understand that American practice makes no such distinction. Here, public notice-and-comment control. Then, when those proposals get to Congress, its processes are independent of his wishes. The public's votes for its members may or may not have coincided with the vote for him, but in any event they are independent of his political preferences. They do not constitute a singular "government" in the parliamentary sense. In the case of divided government, the enactment of legislation that the President supports is far from assured. Enactment of a presidential draft into law is quite unlikely, even on topics with bipartisan support.
Collectivity and responsibility to the legislature are missing as well from the administrative generation of secondary legislation, that is, regulations. Congressional authorizations for rulemaking, as this process is called, almost invariably place it with a particular administrator.
"In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker," 7 but it has long been accepted that Congress can place the power to adopt regulations, a form of hard law, in the hands of a particular administrator, who generally acts after the public consultation process specified by the federal Administrative Procedure Act. 8 Once it has done so, its formal capacity to alter administrative actions (beyond, that is, the discipline that may be inflicted by budgetary restrictions or oversight hearings) is limited to new statutory measures -which, quite beyond the difficulties created by the internal complexities of the legislative process, must be able to survive a presidential veto.
The Office of the President, and not a ministerial collective, is also responsible for any oversight of agency notice-and-comment rulemaking, the American secondary legislation process. Here, political (but not legally required) considerations differentiate its relation to rulemaking in independent regulatory bodies and other elements of administrative government.
7 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) . 8 5 U.S.C. § 553. The process is described in (Strauss 2016) .
Statutorily rulemaking is an activity internal to the individual governmental units on which
Congress has conferred the power to engage in it. Beginning in the administration of President Jimmy Carter, however, and as it became evident that rulemaking had become a major source of legal obligation in the American economy, Presidents have used Executive Orders 9 to put in place measures that require presidential engagements with important rulemakings. These measures (which, again, have a singular, not a collective, political character) 10 have steadily grown stronger over the years. They invite all agencies to participate in an annual regulatory planning activity, permitting presidential input into agency policy-making priorities and eventuating in a public "Regulatory Plan" creating advance notice of possible forthcoming regulatory activity. Executive agencies, but not the independent bodies, are then required to engage in cost-benefit analysis procedures under the supervision of a White House office, the Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) for their important individual rulemakings. In American administrative law, it may be remarked, these "ministry-level" bodies (such as the Environmental Protection Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration or the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration), and not the independent regulatory commissions, are the ones responsible for the bulk of regulations having an important impact on the American economy.
Whether the resulting presidential power over the bodies Congress has authorized to engage in rulemaking has become excessive, whether that power is exercised as transparently as it should be, and whether it has become excessively politicized (rather than grounded in objective and normative policy considerations) are matters now hotly debated in the American literature. (Kagan 2001; Calabresi and Yoo 2008; Strauss2007) . But instincts grounded in expectations about parliamentary government -that this activity is a coordinated activity for which the government is collectively responsible -these instincts must be suppressed when considering the American practice.
Congress and administrative agencies 2.1 Formation
As has often been remarked, there is a hole in the American Constitution (Mashaw 2014 ).
The government is not there -well, barely there. Article I speaks to the Congress and its powers;
Article II to the President and his powers; and Article III to the judiciary. A clause in Article I authorizes Congress to enact any legislation "necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," but notwithstanding these words the Constitution vests no powers "in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." 11 This phrase appears to be an overlooked residue of an earlier draft that would have specified several cabinet departments with particular responsibilities. The universal understanding today is that the national government is exclusively to be created by statute and, save for the powers the Constitution vests in the President himself and any that might be found implicit in his personal office (Monaghan 1993) , executive bodies only take the form and enjoy only the legal authority that Congress enacts. Save as statutes might authorize him to do so, the Both the fact of required confirmation, which creates in officials a relationship of honor if not legal obligation between themselves and the Senate, and the striking contrast between "Commander in Chief" and "Opinion, in writing," suppose a certain distance between the President and the heads of the bodies Congress creates to carry out the laws it enacts.
Readers perhaps know that, despite this striking textual contrast, some scholars and some presidential actions argue that the President's authority over domestic government is plenary --that the discretionary authorities Congress may have created in particular agencies are in fact his to exercise (Calabresi and Yoo 2008; Prakash 2016) . In the author's judgment, these propositions cannot be squared with the constitutional scheme -and, indeed, suggest a potential for oneperson government that would have been alarming to the Constitution's drafters (Strauss 2007 Although the principal officers of government bodies -that is, those subject to supervision only by the President -must be senatorially confirmed, Congress can authorize the appointment of inferior officers by the President acting alone, or by the heads of particular Departments or agencies. To do so, as it often has, gives up the controls inherent in the confirmation process.
When it then delays or even refuses confirmation of principal officers, government agencies are controlled by these inferior officers, responsible only to the President or perhaps even civil service officials; in the case of multi-member commissions, the agencies may lack the quorum necessary to act. commissions,' typically headed by multi-member commissions serving staggered fixed terms in office. The leadership of these bodies must be established by the nomination-and-confirmation process. All are elements of the executive branch, and hence within the President's obligation to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' 13 Differences to other parts of the executive are a matter of degree and detail only (Strauss, 1984) .
Because the President alone has the responsibility for assuring the faithful execution of the laws, only executive officials -not the Congress -enjoy the power to appoint or remove subordinate executive officials from office. 14 (less important officials within the 'Civil Service' of the executive branch are neither appointed nor may they be dismissed politically.) As respects single administrators appointed with senatorial advice and consent, the removal power is in general unlimited; they serve 'at will,' and typically resign at a change in presidential administration. Congress has successfully required the President to make a showing of 'cause' if he wishes to remove some advice-and-consent officers, notably but not exclusively the 13 U.S. Constitution art. II, § 3. 14 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) .
commissioners of the independent regulatory commissions serving fixed terms of office.
15
Emphasizing commissioners' necessary subjection to presidential oversight, however, the Court recently found Congress constitutionally precluded from to assigning a similar "for cause" removal authority to an independent regulatory commission that Congress had empowered to appoint and control a subordinate board of independent actors; that, the Court reasoned, would place those board members at too great a distance from the constitutionally requisite possibility of presidential oversight.
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In creating various subordinate governmental and quasi-governmental bodies, Congress has been highly imaginative over the years, and this has occasionally given rise to questions about the limits of its authority to do so. 
Authority
Agencies have only the authority Congress creates for them, both as to the subject matter of their work, and the forms of action they may use in doing that work. Thus, statutory constraints, substantive and procedural, are always in question in relation to administrative agency behaviors affecting the public. Typically, subject matter is focused in a particular area of concern, although the terms for agency action are often stated in capacious terms. The Clean Air Act, for example, provides that the Administrator of the Environmental Agency is to adopt primary and secondary national air quality standards for each air pollutant she has identified such that (1) National primary ambient air quality standards … shall be ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health. … [and] (2) Any national secondary ambient air quality standard … shall specify a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria, is requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air. … 18 It should be apparent that this statute provides the Administrator with substantial choice over regulatory targets, as well a good deal of room ('based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, . . . requisite to protect the public health') within which to act against them. The Administrator is authorized not only to adopt these standards, following the statutorily prescribed rulemaking procedures, but also to enforce them, and to seek penalties for their violation in proceedings that begin within the agency, before one of its administrative law judges.
In a constitutional system that radically separates the powers of Congress, President, and courts, one might think Congress would be precluded from empowering the executive to adopt secondary legislation and initially to adjudicate its violation, as well as to enforce it. Often styled 'delegation of legislative authority,' the regulatory adoption problem is better characterized as 'creation of executive authority.' This authority then is conditioned by judicial control of the legality of its exercise. As may be surprising to persons used to parliamentary governments, once Congress has authorized an executive actor to adopt secondary legislation implementing a statutory charge, it can disapprove it only by enacting a statute doing so 19 -and that, of course, requires either a presidential signature (unlikely to be used to defeat an act of his administration) or the supermajorities required for both houses successfully to override a presidential veto. There is, to be sure, a special statute, the Congressional Review Act (CRA), that assures prompt notification to Congress of rules once adopted and provides a rapid means for summary disapproval; 20 but the CRA has been successfully used only once in the almost two decades since it was enacted, 21 and then because a change in presidential administration intervened between the rule's adoption and its disapproval. valid, has the force and effect of a statute. Three constraints differentiate these measures from statutes: they must be statutorily authorized; they must be adopted following statutory procedures that enable significant public input to which reasoned responses must be made; and their legally validity (and factual support) is subject to considerably greater judicial scrutiny on review than would be the case for statutes.
22
Proper statutory authorization depends on the existence of an 'intelligible principle' so that a reviewing court can assess their legality. 23 By requiring an 'intelligible principle,' American courts constrain the scope of agency discretion by themselves delimiting the space within which agencies are empowered to act, and by checking as well the reasonableness of agency actions.
Reasonableness review of regulations is a process considerably more intensive than attends inquiries into the constitutionality of primary legislation. To be sure, an 'intelligible principle' is not a very demanding standard, and much of the American debate over 'delegation' has addressed its indefiniteness. The very existence of the requirement, however, gives agency officials an incentive to frame their actions to support the appearance of legality, incorporating extended explanations of their reasoning process in their required explanatory statements, supplying and explaining supporting data, and so forth (Stack 2015) . The intensity of judicial review characteristic of the most important rulemaking only heightens that impulse. In a number of cases, the courts have adopted constructions of agency authority narrowing the policy space 22 5 U.S.C. § § 553, 706. 23 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001). within which agencies are able to act -refusing, as Justice Scalia once colorfully put it, to find that Congress would 'hide elephants in mouseholes.' 24 The more important point, however, is that the courts regularly uphold agencies in their authority, for example, to define acceptable levels of ozone in the atmosphere, to require that cars contain air bags having defined operating characteristics, to specify the terms of valid offerings and sales on stock exchanges, and so forth.
Subsequent control
Once Congress has created an agency with an initial scope of authority, its subsequent direct controls over agency behavior derive from agencies' need to secure additional congressional statutes authorizing further actions they might wish to take, their usual need to secure congressional funding for their activities in the annual appropriations process (some agencies are given, to greater or lesser extent, the possibility of self-funding through fees they are permitted to charge for the services they render) and -politically -through the possibility of calling agency officials to appear before them in 'oversight' hearings in which their conduct of office might be publicly and embarrassingly challenged.
A further inhibition on the American Congress's possibilities of control, already mentioned, may seem quite remarkable in comparative context. Once an executive official is in office, Congress's capacity to remove her is limited to the cumbersome process of impeachment.
Congress might successfully limit the President's authority of removal by requiring him to demonstrate 'cause' for removal. Whether 'cause' has successfully been demonstrated has never 24 Id. at 468. On the related judicial presumption that Congress does not generally delegate to agencies the authority to settle questions of 'vast economic and political significance,' see B. Emerson (2016) , 'Administrative Answers to "Major Questions": On the Democratic Authority of Agency Statutory Interpretation,' available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2818786, accessed 7 September 2016.
to my knowledge arisen as a legal issue, but in practice, like ordinary civil service protections, the requirement provides some assurance of continuance in office. And Congress's possibility to impose such a limit seems substantial. It clearly lacks the authority to do so only for those few officers (such as the Secretary of State) who of necessity serve, as Chief Justice Marshall early put it, as "the mere organ by whom [the President's] will is communicated," so that "nothing can be more perfectly clear that their acts are only politically examinable," 25 and the consequent need for peremptory presidential control of their tenure in office is obvious. 26 The bulk of executive officials, however, exercise a discretion that is tolerable only because it is constrained by law and subject to judicial control for its legality; 27 as to these officials, who are not the President's alter ego, the possibility that Congress can prevent the President from removing them except for In parliamentary systems, the political allegiances between those who are responsible for creating the national budget and those who will enact it more-or-less assure that the budget will reflect political consensus about how the nation's available financial resources should best be 52 (1926) . 27 'Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly -and courts have upheld such delegation because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within those limits by an administration that is not irrational or discriminatory. ' Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) . 28 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
distributed. The 'power of the purse' is indeed a potent political instrument, and congressional use of it can create situations quite at odds with presidential preferences. The President may have staffed the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration with appointees strongly favoring regulatory actions to safeguard worker health and safety; but if
Congress only appropriates funds sufficient to attend to 40 thousand of the nation's more than 8 million workplaces, its preferences for weak enforcement will prevail. In recent years, budgetary enactments have tended to be part of omnibus legislation that effectively precludes significant congressional debate over their specifics, considerably empowering the appropriations committees that consider particular elements of the President's annual budget submission. That these enormous, consolidated bills are subject to a simple up-or-down vote permits, as well, the intrusion into them by a Member or Members of particular riders forbidding the expenditure of any funds to support activities of which he or they disapprove. And the President is then able to approve or disapprove only the appropriations measure as a whole; he cannot veto particular elements he finds unwise (as the governors of some American states can under their state constitutions), or improperly supportive of special interests.
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In conducting oversight hearings, congressional committees exercise no formal authority over executive action, but they may nonetheless be able to produce significant practical constraints on agency action. Congressional demands for agency information are not readily if the hearing is not motivated by hostility, as in the case of divided government or in the wake of calamity, having to prepare and then testify subtracts time and energy from the agency leadership, and these necessities may arise with great frequency.
A professional body now known as the Government Accountability Office, 30 several thousand strong, serves Congress both as a financial auditor of the legality of appropriations expenditures, and as a performance auditor seeking out waste and inefficiencies in agency function. Like the Inspectors General serving government departments and important agencies, these bureaucrats may be housed in the agency itself, and enjoy unimpeded access to agency officials and documents; their reports, provided to agency heads for possible response before transmission to Congress, earn considerable attention there, as well as informing Congress.
Courts, administrative agencies and the place of politics
One might think control of administration by courts, 'the rule of law,' to be entirely distinct from political controls, and the Supreme Court's first discussion of constitutional review appeared to draw that line explicitly. S. 919 (1996) . 34 Compare n. 27 above. 35 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) .
trial-like proceedings can be enormous; EPA's civil penalties run to millions of dollars, and the SSA has a docket of disability cases greater than that of the federal judicial system. The possibility of judicial review suffices to permit these assignments.
Beginning around 1970, perhaps as an outgrowth of the successful use of the courts to battle racial injustice in public administration, litigation to promote 'public interest' propositions dramatically increased. The 'political question' exclusion of such issues as legislative districting ended. 36 With growing awareness of the environmental impact of super-highways and other governmental projects, lawsuits to enforce statutory constraints became common. 37 Although standing to invoke the courts' aid has long required the demonstration of an injury in fact, caused by government action and remediable by the courts, a decision of the 1970s significantly expanded this access; it treated as the necessary 'injury in fact' any harm resulting from a challenged action that could reasonably be associated with the concerns of the statute plaintiffs were attempting to enforce. Injury to a conventional legal right would not be required. 38 For example, someone regularly using a particular element of public lands could have standing to challenge a governmental action that would impair her aesthetic enjoyment of the land, endanger the trout she liked to fish for, or end its wilderness character. This liberal access to judicial review corresponded with, and reinforced, growing perceptions that federal agencies facing judicial review only at the behest of those they regulated had become insensitive to the public values they were charged to protect (Stewart 1975 is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish.
In an email to me, Professor Cynthia Farina well captured the stakes in the ongoing Court disputes over this quite complex, even abstruse, question:
All these efforts to restrict access to judicial review create asymmetric pressure on agencies because they disproportionately close out intended and incidental beneficiary challenges. So, judicial review works as a one-way ratchet, always pushing in the deregulatory direction. . . .
[T] here is no way to understand standing doctrine except as a series of battles . . . in a war between two irreconcilable political philosophies about the appropriate role of government. If we [the holders of the more conservative philosophy] can't limit regulatory programs directly via a robust non-delegation doctrine, we can at least ensure that judicial review always works against assertions of regulatory authority. has been authorized to decide matters subject to judicial oversight (Strauss 2012) . To invoke a sports analogy, in the first sense the court is the 'player' in the game, whose independent actions might be influenced by the views of another; in the second, it is in the position of 'referee,' who must permit others to play within established boundaries, subject to its enforcement of the game's rules. 'Discretion' is another term of uncertain meaning, that we have met in the contrast between the acts of those who serve as the President's alter ego (say, the Secretary of State), outside the ambit of judicial controls, and the decisions of those on whom Congress has conferred an authority that can only be sustained if its legality can be assured on judicial review.
The APA provides for judicial review of 'discretion' of the latter, but not the former, type; 45 and even within that type what constitutes an "abuse of discretion" is not a singular concept, but varies in intensity among the variety of contexts in which it occurs (Strauss 2016) .
Conclusion
Perhaps by the time this essay is in print the current American political uncertainties will have been somewhat resolved ---at least until the following elections. What one can understand is that in the American system, in ways distinct from what one might experience in parliamentary democracies with a judiciary less subject to political selection, politics and 'the rule of law' are in considerable tension. American jurisprudence has come well past Chief Justice Marshall's declaration that courts could have no business examining (and hence constraining by the operation of law) any matter committed to the executive's discretion. For the normal issues of domestic policy, judicial review is, in essence, a constitutional requisite. Politics operates nonetheless.
45 5 U.S.C. § § 701(a)(2), 706(2)(A).
Over the library entrance to Columbia Law School, where I teach, looms Jacques Lipchitz's enormous sculpture, Bellerophon Taming Pegasus -a metaphor for reason's struggle with unreason, well suited to a school of law. The force of the metaphor is all the clearer when one sees that the sculptor has merged Pegasus into Bellerophon's head -the unreason he is taming, quite a painful struggle to judge by the horse's expression, is his own. In the United States if not elsewhere, administrative law sits in that painful place, a continuing contest between reason and unreason, and one must continuously work to make the influence of the former substantial.
